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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DONALD KITCHEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No, 900307 CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of right made pursuant to Title 77, Part 
35, Section 26 of the Utah Code and Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the 
Utah Court of Appeals. This court has appellate jurisdiction in 
this case pursuant to Title 28, Part 2a, Section 5(2) of the Utah 
Code. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction of the 
second degree felony offense of possession of a controlled 
substance, cocaine, with intent to distribute entered in the 
Fourth District Court in and for Juab County following a bench 
trial before the Honorable Boyd L. Park, District Judge. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
POINT I: Whether it is "unreasonable" to stop and detain 
all motorists at a roadblock because Utah statutes limit the 
authority of officers to stop persons either for the purpose of 
checking driver's licenses and vehicle safety or to investigate 
possible criminal violations to situations where the officer has 
reasonable suspicion that a violation has occurred. 
POINT II: Whether roadblocks are per se unconstitutional 
under Section 14, Article I, of the Constitution of Utah. 
POINT III: In the alternative, whether the roadblock in this 
case violated the state and federal constitutions because it was 
not conducted pursuant to standards which were developed by 
policy making officials in response to a particularized, 
justifying, public need and which minimized the discretion of 
officers in the field and the intrusion upon rights of the 
public. 
POINT IV: Whether the warrant clause of Section 14, Article 
I of the Constitution of Utah prohibits a warrantless search of 
luggage in a vehicle where there is no evidence that delay to get 
a warrant would endanger the officers or evidence. 
2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AND STATUTE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of Utah provide: 
The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code Annotated, provides in relevant 
part: 
Department and officers to enforce 
provisions. 
The commission, and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall 
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen, 
and others duly authorized by the department 
or by law shall have power and it shall be 
their duty: 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that 
any vehicle is being operated in violation of 
any provision of this act or of any other law 
regulating the operation of vehicles to 
require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit 
his driver's license and the registration 
card issued for the vehicles and submit to an 
inspection of such vehicle, the registration 
plates and registration card thereon. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The appellant, Donald Kitchen, was charged by information 
with the second degree felony of possession of cocaine, a 
controlled substance, with intent to distribute in violation of 
Section 58-37-l(a), Utah Code. 
Course of the Proceedings and Disposition 
Prior to trial, appellant made a motion to suppress all 
evidence seized by law enforcement officers as a result of the 
detention of the appellant at a roadblock and the subsequent 
searches of his automobile for the reason that the detention and 
searches were in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Constitution 
of Utah. (R-9) . An evidentiary hearing was held at which the 
facts surrounding the implementation of a roadblock on 1-15 in 
Juab County, the detention of appellant at that roadblock and the 
subsequent searches of the appellant's vehicle, were developed. 
Following briefing by the parties, the district court filed a 
Ruling setting out its findings and conclusions and denying the 
motion to suppress. (R-26-36). 
The appellant waived his right to jury trial and matter was 
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submitted to the district court upon the stipulation of the 
parties that the court make a determination of guilt or 
innocence based upon the evidence submitted at the motion to 
suppress. Based upon that evidence, the court found the 
appellant guilty. (Hearing Transcript, May 8, 1990). 
Following the preparation of a pre-sentence report, the 
appellant was sentenced to pay a fine and serve a prison sentence 
which was suspended upon the condition that the appellant serve 
120 days in jail and submit to other conditions of probation. 
The district court issued a Certificate of Probable Cause and 
Stay staying the sentence pending this appeal. (R-48). 
The final, written Judgment was filed on June 21, 1990. (R-
54). The Notice of Appeal was filed on June 5, 1990 (R-44) , 
immediately following the imposition of sentence in open court. 
Relevant Facts 
The evidence supporting the appellant's conviction was 
obtained as a result of the seizure of the appellant and the 
search of his vehicle by law enforcement officers at a roadblock 
on 1-15 in Juab County on May 17, 1989. The roadblock was 
established under the supervision of Highway Patrol Sergeant 
Paul Mangelson in connection with a "criminal interdiction" 
class which Sergeant Mangelson was teaching to local law 
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enforcement officers, and which, according to Sergeant Mangelson, 
involved: 
Teaching them techniques of getting into 
vehicles. Certain things that indicate 
contraband in the vehicles what have you. 
(Transcript, Suppression Hearing at pp. 5, 6, 17, 18 [Hereinafter 
T- ]). However, Sergeant Mangelson testified that the purpose 
of the roadblock itself was a safety check of equipment and 
driver's licenses. (T-41-42). Sergeant Mangelson was teaching 
officers what things to look for which might indicate illegal 
activity, in the routine course of duty rather than teaching them 
how to conduct a roadblock. (T-42). Apparently, the roadblock 
served the function of providing a large number of motorists upon 
which to demonstrate and practice these skills. 
Neither the Department of Motor Vehicles nor the Highway 
Patrol have any regulations on how to conduct roadblocks. (T-
18-19) . The plan for conducting the roadblock was devised by 
Sergeant Mangelson and approved by his supervisor, Lieutenant 
Utley. (T-19). The location in Juab County was selected because 
of the traffic conditions there. (T-19). Traffic in both 
directions was intercepted and commercial traffic was diverted 
around the roadblock while all other traffic was directed into a 
lane delineated by orange cones to wait to talk to officers. An 
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officer would request the driver's license and vehicle 
registration and look over the vehicle, and, occupants and if 
there were any problem, the vehicle would be directed to the side 
of the road for further investigation. (T-8). 
Orange signs similar to those used to warn of road 
construction were placed along the approach to the roadblock, 
the first showing the symbol of a flag man, the second stating 
"Prepare to Stop" and the third stating "All Traffic Must Stop." 
(T-22) . The first sign was positioned one quarter mile in 
advance of the roadblock. (T-24). The roadblock was positioned 
so that motorists could not avoid it by exiting the interstate 
and officers were stationed to pursue anyone, even a passenger, 
who attempted to avoid the roadblock. (T-25). Approximately 35 
officers were involved in the operation. (T-6). 
A notice that the Highway Patrol would conduct roadblocks 
in Juab County in the summer months had been published in the 
Daily Herald of Orem on May 2, 1989 and the Times News of Juab 
County on May 3, 1989. (T-19-22). Sergeant Mangelson testified 
that only a small percentage of the people stopped were from the 
circulation area of those newspapers (T-21) and that the 
likelihood of anyone traveling in either direction on the 
interstate highway having read the local papers was remote. (T-
37) . 
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At about 11:00 a.m.,1 the appellant, accompanied by a 
passenger, Daniel Burke, drove up to the roadblock. (T-2 6). 
They were diverted into the area delineated by orange cones and 
waited for at least five or ten minutes (T-69-86) behind four to 
eight cars which were in line ahead of them (T-73-91) until 
Officer John Lloyd approached and requested appellant's driver's 
license and vehicle registration (T-9), which the appellant 
produced. (T-28). 
Mr. Burke testified that while appellant was talking to 
Officer Lloyd, Sergeant Mangelson, who was walking along 
observing the cars in line ahead of them (T-75) , walked around 
the front of their car and opened the passenger door requesting 
identification from Mr. Burke. (T-63) . Mr. Burke gave him his 
driver's license and answered questions about his destination. 
Sergeant Mangelson asked if they had any drugs or money and Mr. 
Burke said "no." Sergeant Mangelson then said, "Well, then you 
don't mind if we look around." Mr. Burke deferred to appellant 
who indicated that he would not consent to a search. (T-65). 
Sergeant Mangelson responded by ordering appellant to pull the 
car over on the shoulder of the road and then ordered Mr. Burke 
out of the car. Sergeant Mangelson then leaned into the car and 
1
 The roadblock began at 7:00 a.m. and was to be 
maintained until noon. Ibid. 
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appeared to look around after which he turned and asked Mr. Burke 
if he "smoked a little grass." Mr. Burke said "no" and Sergeant 
Mangelson said "you might as well give it to me because I know 
you have it." Mr. Burke denied having any and held up his arms 
while Sergeant Mangelson "frisked" him without result. Sergeant 
Mangelson then went back to searching the car (T-66) and, after 
Sergeant Mangelson apparently located some contraband, Mr. Burke 
heard him arrest appellant, who was still in the car, and then 
instructed another officer to arrest Mr. Burke. (T-67). 
Mr. Burke testified that after he was arrested he stood by 
the line of vehicles and observed that older people were waived 
through the roadblock without having to produce a driver's 
license. (T-68). Other cars were searched "a little bit" and 
the car behind appellant's, which was occupied by a young couple, 
was searched by officers including suit cases which were in the 
truck, apparently without incriminating result because the young 
couple was allowed to leave. (T-68). 
The appellant gave testimony similar to Mr. Burke. He 
testified that he was approached at the roadblock by an officer 
who asked for his driver's license and registration which he 
produced. There ensued a conversation about his destination and 
his permission to drive the car which was his mother's. The 
officer then asked another officer if it was allright to let them 
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go. At that time the passenger door was opened, surprising the 
passenger who was leaning on it. (T-86-87). 
After the conversation between Mr. Burke and Sergeant 
Mangelson, the Sergeant asked for permission to search the 
vehicle. When appellant refused, Sergeant Mangelson ordered him 
to pull his car over to the shoulder of the highway. Sergeant 
Mangelson then leaned into the car and commenced to search 
through the console between the seats. (T-88). At that point, 
Sergeant Mangelson told appellant that he smelled Marijuana and 
that he wanted it produced to save everyone time and trouble. 
The appellant pulled a small quantity of Marijuana out of the 
console "Because he was searching there anyway . . . I thought he 
would be a lot nicer if I gave it to him.11 (T-89) . 
Officer John Lloyd, the officer who first approached 
appellant and requested his driver's license, did not testify. 
Sergeant Mangelson testified that he was standing behind Officer 
Lloyd while Lloyd talked to appellant and could detect a strong 
odor of burnt Marijuana coming from the vehicle. (T-9). 
Sergeant Mangelson then walked around the car to the passenger 
side and asked if there were Marijuana in the vehicle and was 
told there was not. Sergeant Mangelson asked if he could look 
around the vehicle and when he was refused, ordered the vehicle 
to the side of the road. Sergeant Mangelson testified he ordered 
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the passenger out of the vehicle and announced that he could 
smell Marijuana and they might as well give it to him. Appellant 
produced two baggies that appeared to contain about a quarter 
ounce of Marijuana. (T-10, 16). While Sergeant Mangelson's 
testimony conflicted with that of appellant and Mr. Burke in that 
he claimed he requested and received the Marijuana before he 
started to search, he also testified that he had decided he would 
search and made that clear to appellant at the time he told him 
to produce it and "save us a lot of time and trouble." (T-30-
32) . 
Sergeant Mangelson testified that he noticed a bulge in 
appellant's shirt pocket and asked what it was. The appellant, 
who appeared to be very nervous, replied it was money and when 
asked how much said, "$2,000.00", explaining he was going to Las 
Vegas to gamble. Appellant, at the Sergeantfs request, produced 
the bundle and Sergeant Mangelson counted $1,000.00 of it and 
concluded that there was a lot more than $2,000.00. (T-ll). 
Sergeant Mangelson then discovered a small vial with white 
powder, which appeared to him to be cocaine, in the console 
between the car seats (T-12), and formally placed appellant and 
Mr. Burke under arrest. Searching the car further, the officers 
located seven baggies, containing what was later determined to be 
a total of 27 ounces of cocaine, in one of three suit cases in 
11 
the back of the vehicle. (T-13). 
In a later search, officers discovered a small vial, con-
taining the remnants of Marijuana cigarettes, in a pouch in the 
passenger door of the vehicle. (T-14). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The probable cause for the searches which produced the 
incriminating evidence in this case derived directly from the 
initial seizure of the person and automobile of the appellant at 
the roadblock established by field officers of the Highway 
Patrol. 
Point I. This seizure was in violation of both Section 
14, Article I of the Utah Constitution and the United States 
Constitution because the Utah Legislature has specifically 
limited the authority of law enforcement officers to stop 
motorists for purposes of checking driver's licenses and safety 
inspections and for purposes of investigating criminal activity 
to situations where the officer has a reasonable belief a vehicle 
is being operated in violation of law or reasonable suspicion 
that a public offense is, has been or will be committed. 
Point II. Regardless of the question of statutory 
authority, the Utah Constitution prohibits seizures of the person 
in the absence of particularized suspicion, rendering roadblocks 
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per se unconstitutional. The Utah Constitution provides more 
j-i*.- J i * v * r i * r.<- jiuueu States Constitution. The 
value privac *.: .e * ' - state *-o state, and Utah's unique 
history and culture has resulted in a higher degree of protection 
of pri vacy and 1 ibert} thai i the * -•-.; ::vei mandated by the 
national constitution. Idaho, the state w ;*b +-he most similar 
history and culture and <. identically worded constitution, 
prohi bi ts roadt "* .s • . . - 91::i tut ional , 
Point III. ',. ternativei . * roadblocks are permitted under 
the Utah Constitutior . .1 : , • legislation - * * -equired. the 
roadb1ock i n th i s c , « - onethe1ess uncons11tutional because 
- ;.- ' conducted pursuant to standards, which were developed 
c; "\d enforced by policy making officials ::• response to a:i 1 
pcirticui •. - .-red and justifying need and wnxcxi minimized the 
discretion i>f 'the officers in the fi eld and the intrusion upon 
privacy and liberty of the traveling public. 
Point IV Reqard ] ess of the legal ity of the Initial seizure 
and search, and assuming the existence of probable . aazse tne 
warrantless search of appellant's suitcase ; - * ::<.* 1 h;,, 
vehicle was in violation 01 Section 14, Article 1 U true 
Constitution of Utah because the warrant clause requires that a 
warrant be obtained unless the state proves that the ensuming 
delay would have endangered the officers or the integrity of the 
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evidence • The search of the suitcase did not occur until after 
the vehicle and its occupants were securely in the custody of the 
many officers at the scene. The search of the suitcase was not 
claimed to be an inventory search, nor could it have been, 
because the opening of containers is not constitutionally 
permitted in the absence of a standardized procedure mandating 
the opening of all containers whenever a vehicle is impounded. 
DETAIL OF ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The evidence upon which the appellant was convicted was all 
seized during the searches of the appellant's vehicle at the 
roadblock and later at an impound lot. The district court found, 
Ruling (R-33), that the probable cause for these searches was 
that Sergeant Mangelson could smell the odor of Marijuana coming 
from the car while appellant was talking to Officer Lloyd through 
the driver's window. However, it is elementary that probable 
cause, and even reasonable suspicion for a seizure, cannot be 
based upon an olfaction made during, and as a exploitation of, an 
illegal detention. See, e.g., State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 
1217 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Therefore, the validity of the 
searches and the conviction based upon the fruits of those 
searches turns upon the validity of the initial seizure of 
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appellant at the roadblock. There can be no question but that 
even a momentary, intentional stop by a law enforcement officer 
at a checkpoint constitutes a "seizure" within the constitutional 
meaning. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 58 
L.W. 4781, 4783 (June 14, 1990). 
Appellant will here follow the outline suggested in Davis 
and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the Constitutionality of 
Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 3 BYU J. PUB. L. 357, (1989), 
beginning with the question of whether there is statutory 
authority (which appellant believes is dispositive) and 
proceeding in the alternative, to whether the Utah Constitution 
prohibits roadblocks and then, again alternatively, whether this 
roadblock was planned and conducted in a constitutional manner. 
POINT I. R O . A D B L O C K S T O P S A R E 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE UTAH STATUTES LIMIT 
THE AUTHORITY OF OFFICERS TO DETAIN TO 
SITUATIONS WHERE THE OFFICER HAS REASONABLE 
AND INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION OF VIOLATION OF 
LAW. 
As Davis and Wallentine, supra, stress, the first question 
to be resolved is the question whether the legislature has 
granted authority to officers to stop motorists at roadblocks: 
In order to be constitutional a roadblock 
must be premised upon state statutory 
authority, either explicit or implicit. 
Without such authority the roadblock is per 
15 
se unconstitutional. 
3 BYU J. PUB, L. at 360. The United States Supreme Court held in 
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), 
that while Congress clearly could have constitutionally 
authorized a forcible entry to inspect a licensed liquor 
establishment without a warrant, Congress had not done so and 
therefore such an entry violated the Fourth Amendment. The 
Oregon Supreme Court likewise held that a detention at a 
roadblock was in violation of its state constitutional seizure 
protections because there was not statutory authority for 
roadblocks and, therefore, the Oregon court found it unnecessary 
to determine whether its legislature could have constitutionally 
authorized roadblocks. Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Ore. 97, 743 
P.2d 692 (1987); accord, State v. Bovanosky, 304 Ore. 131, 743 
P.2d 715 (1987); see also, State v. Smith, 674 P.2d 562 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1984); State v. Henderson, 114 Ida. 293, 756 P.2d 1057 
(1988) . 
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the statutory authority 
must be explicit and not implied: 
roadblocks are seizures of the 
person or the person's effects. For this 
reason, the authority cannot be implied. 
Before they search or seize executive 
agencies must have explicit authority from 
outside the executive branch. 
16 
743 P.2d at 695. 
Davis and Wallentine point out that there is no explicit 
statutory authorization in Utah but suggest that a Utah 
appellate court might find implied authority in general statutes 
concerning the duty to enforce laws. 3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 361-63. 
The district court, although not addressing this issue in its 
written Ruling, stated at the bench trial that it relied upon the 
oath officers take to uphold the laws which that court somehow 
construed to constitute legislative authority to effectuate 
appropriate roadblocks. Hearing Transcript, May 8, 1990, pp. 3-
4. 
The difficulty with the search for implied authority in Utah 
legislation, assuming that implied authority is constitutionally 
acceptable, is that the Utah Legislature has explicitly limited 
the authority of officers to effectuate both "administrative" 
and "investigatory" stops. Sergeant Mangelson claimed the 
roadblock was primarily for the purpose of checking for driver's 
licenses and vehicle registration and to inspect the vehicle for 
safety. (T-41-42). The Utah Legislature in the Motor Vehicle 
Act has defined the power of officers to stop motorists and 
inspect papers and the vehicle as follows: 
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Department and officers to enforce 
provisions. 
The commission, and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall 
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen, 
and others duly authorized by the department 
or by law shall have power and it shall be 
their duty: 
(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief that 
any vehicle is being operated in violation of 
any provision of this act or of any under 
law regulating the operation of vehicles to 
require the driver thereof to stop, exhibit 
his driver's license and the registration 
card issued for the vehicles and submit to an 
inspection of such vehicle, the registration 
plates and registration card thereon. 
Section 41-1-17, Utah Code. (Emphasis added). This limitation 
of the authority to stop and inspect to situations where an 
officer has reasonable belief that a particular vehicle is being 
operated in violation of law is additionally significant because 
of the fact that it is unusual. Professor LaFave states: 
Virtually all states have adopted legislation 
requiring every motorist to carry his driver's license 
while operating a vehicle and to display same upon 
demand of a police officer or other designated 
official. A representative statute reads as follows: 
Every licensee or permittee shall have his 
drivers 1Lcense or permit in his immediate 
possession at all times when operating a 
motor vehicle and, for the purpose of 
indicating compliance with the requirement 
shall display such license or permit if it is 
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his possession upon demand made, when in 
uniform or displaying a badge or other sign 
of authority, by a member of the State 
Police, a sheriff or other police officer or 
designated agent of the Secretary of State. 
Similarly, the various jurisdictions have also adopted 
legislation requiring motorists to display upon demand 
the registration papers for the vehicles they are 
driving. 
4 LaFave, Search and Seizure, 52, 53 (2d ed. 1987). (Footnotes 
omitted). Thus virtually every other state imposes a duty to 
display licenses and registration "upon demand", implying the 
right and power of officers to make the demand simply because a 
person is operating a vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson testified that 
he believed he was authorized to demand to inspect a driver's 
license simply because a person was driving. (T-23). This 
belief perhaps derives from some universal police lore which may 
have validity in virtually all other states but it is simply not 
true in Utah. A Utah driver has no duty to display his license 
or submit his vehicle to inspection unless he or she has done 
something to raise a belief of wrongdoing. 
The United States Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 44 0 
U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, (1979), while holding 
that random spot checks for purposes of checking licenses was a 
violation of the fourth amendment suggested in dictum that the 
states might develop less intrusive methods of checking driver's 
licenses such as stopping all traffic at a roadblock. 440 U.S. 
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at 664. However, while the Utah Legislature might authorize a 
roadblock for checking licenses without violating the Fourth 
Amendment, it has not done so, and, in legislation on the 
particular subject of driver's license display and vehicle 
inspection, it has limited the officer's right to stop to where 
he has a reasonable belief that a violation has occurred. 
The question of whether the Utah Constitution would permit 
legislation authorizing the stopping of all traffic at a 
roadblock is discussed, infra, but the question is moot since the 
legislature has considered the question of how much authority to 
grant officers to stop vehicles for this purpose and chosen to 
limit it. 
The secondary purpose of the roadblock was to observe for 
signs of other law violations. The Utah Legislature has also 
addressed the authority of officers to stop and detain persons 
for this purpose: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has a reasonable 
suspicion to believe he has committed or is 
in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his 
name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Section 77-7-15, Utah Code Ann. This court has said that: 
"Section 77-7-15 is the statutory codification for a 
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constitutional stop." State v. Sierra, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55, 
754 P.2d 972, 975 (Ct. App. 1988). But, regardless of whether 
the statute sets the constitutional standard, it does statutorily 
limit the authority a Utah peace officer has to interfere with a 
persons liberty and privacy for the purpose of investigating 
possible criminal violations. An officer's oath to enforce the 
law is an oath to act within the statutory law as well, and he 
acts unreasonably within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment 
and Section 14, Article I of the Utah Constitution when he seizes 
a person and his vehicle without statutory authority. 
The balancing of the need to infringe liberty to protect 
important government interests with the citizenfs interest in the 
freedom of travel and privacy should be struck in the first 
instance by the legislature. The Utah Legislature has struck 
that balance in favor of the citizen's right to go unhampered 
about his business absent some individualized and reasonable 
suspicion that a violation of either motor vehicle laws or 
criminal laws has occurred. 
Since the authority of Utah law enforcement officers to stop 
motorists for either the administrative purpose of checking the 
driver's license and vehicle safety or the investigative purpose 
of observing for violations of law has been limited, Sergeant 
Mangelson and his students acted in violation of the Fourth 
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Amendment and Section 14, Article I when they stopped and 
detained appellant at the roadblock in this case. 
POINT II: ROADBLOCKS ARE PROHIBITED 
BY SECTION 14, ARTICLE I, OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
This argument is made in the alternative to that made in 
Point I of this brief and assumes, contrarily to that argument, 
that law enforcement officers have statutory authority to stop 
all motorists either to check driver's licenses and vehicle 
safety or to make observations of possible violations of law. 
The appellate courts of Utah have not, as of this date, 
ruled upon the validity of roadblocks under either the 
Constitution of Utah or the United States Constitution. The Utah 
Supreme Court in a recent decision by Justice Durham joined by 
Justice Zimmerman with Justice Stewart concurring "in the 
result" has recently applied Section 14, Article I, to protect 
the privacy interest in unoccupied automobiles independently from 
the similarly worded Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, quoting with approval the Washington Supreme Court 
in State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 439, 688 P.2d 136, 140-41 
(1984): 
Prior reliance on federal precedent and 
federal constitutional provisions [does] not 
preclude us from taking a more expansive 
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view of [the state constitution] where the 
United States Supreme Court determines to 
further limit federal guarantees in a manner 
inconsistent with our prior pronouncements. 
State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 20 (Sup. Ct. May 20, 
1990) . Since the Utah Court has decided that the search and 
seizure protections of Section 14, Article I, may be more 
extensive than the federal protections, it is appropriate to 
first analyze the validity of roadblocks under the State 
Constitution. As the Washington Supreme Court stated in a 
similar case: 
When parties allege violation of rights 
under both the United States and Washington 
Constitutions, this court will first 
independently interpret and apply the 
Washington Constitution in order, among other 
concerns, to develop a body of independent 
jurisprudence, and because consideration of 
the United States Constitution first would be 
premature. State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 3 64, 
373-74, 679 P.2d 858 (1984). We find the 
sobriety checkpoint program illegal based on 
adequate and independent state grounds. Any 
federal cases cited are used only for the 
purpose of guidance and do not by themselves 
compel the result reached. 
City of Seattle v. Mesiani. 755 P.2d 775, 776 (Wash. 1988) (en 
banc). See also, State v. Kirk. 493 A.2d 1271 (N.J. Super. 1985) 
(State constitution most appropriate to resolve roadblock issue). 
The determination of the constitutionality of roadblocks involves 
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the balancing of the governmental interest served by the 
roadblock against the intrusion upon the citizen's privacy 
interest and/or freedom of movement. It would seem apparent that 
the value to be placed upon privacy and freedom of movement would 
vary from place to place depending on the history and culture of 
the region, making the striking of that balance under state 
constitutions particularly appropriate. It is not surprising 
that, while the number of states upholding roadblocks (whether 
under state or federal constitution) slightly outnumbers those 
invalidating roadblocks, among states considered "Western" in 
culture, a strong majority have found roadblocks 
unconstitutional. See, State v. Henderson, 756 P. 2d 1057, 1062 
n.3 (Idaho 1988).2 It is submitted that this follows from the 
greater importance placed upon both privacy and travel by 
automobile in the West. 
Idaho, which has much in common historically and culturally 
with Utah, has a constitutional provision which is virtually 
2
 Of the jurisdictions listed in Henderson which have 
suppressed evidence from roadblocks six could be considered 
Western in culture: Arizona, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, 
Oregon, and Oklahoma. Idaho should be added to this group as a 
result of Henderson. Of the courts listed as upholding 
roadblocks, only three are from Western states: Arizona (which 
has also ruled the other way), California and New Mexico. 
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identical to Section 14, Article I of the Utah Constitution.3 
The Idaho Supreme Court interpreted that provision to prohibit a 
roadblock, designed to deter and apprehend drunk drivers, which 
was approved by the Boise Chief of Police, widely advertised as 
to date in advance and conducted similarly to the roadblock in 
the instant case. State v. Henderson, supra. That court found 
the state's interest in controlling drunk driving to be 
"compelling" and stated: "Protecting citizens from life-
threatening danger is a paramount concern". Ibid., 756 P.2d at 
1060. However, the Idaho court found from the evidence presented 
that roadblocks are inefficient and therefore were an unnecessary 
constraint upon a person's right to remain free of search and 
seizure absent probable cause. 756 P. 2d at 1060-61. The court 
was also influenced by the lack of legislative authority for 
roadblocks. 756 P. 2d at 1061-62. However, the Idaho court 
seemed most concerned with the fact that roadblocks constitute a 
seizure of the person and a search for evidence without any 
Article I, §17 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
Unreasonable searches and seizures 
prohibited.—The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated and no warrant 
shall issue without probable cause shown by 
affidavit, particularly describing the place 
to be searched and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
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individualized suspicion of wrongdoing by the person seized: 
Perhaps the most important attribute of 
our way of life in Idaho is individual 
liberty • A citizen is free to stroll the 
streets, hike the mountains, and float the 
rivers of this state without interference 
from the government. That is, police treat 
you as a criminal only if your actions 
correspond. Such is not the case with 
roadblocks. 
756 P. 2d at 1063. The court went on to hold roadblocks to be 
unconstitutional under the state constitution reserving the 
question of whether or not the legislature might sanction a 
method of conducting roadblocks with prior judicial approval: 
Accordingly, we hold that where police 
lack express legislative authority, 
particularized suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing and prior judicial approval, 
roadblocks established to apprehend drunk 
drivers cannot withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Although the United States 
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether 
warrantless roadblocks violate the federal 
constitution, we base our decision today 
solely on art. 1, § 17 of the Idaho 
Constitution. The Idaho Constitution can, 
where appropriate, grant more protection than 
its federal counterpart. 
756 P.2d at 1063. (Citation omitted). 
Other cases which have held warrantless roadblocks to check 
for drunk driving to violate the state constitutions in their 
jurisdictions without regard to how the roadblocks are conducted 
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or regulated are: Nelson v. Lane County. 403 Ore. 97, 743 P. 2d 
692 (1987); State v. Boyanovskv, 304 Ore. 181, 743 P.2d 711 
(1987); Citv of Seattle v. Mesiani. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 
775 (1988). 
While Utah appellate courts have not yet squarely ruled on 
the constitutionality of roadblocks, see State v. Talbot, 134 
Utah Adv. Rep. 15, n. 4 (Ct. App. May 9, 1990) there are 
precedents indicating that Utah Courts are at least as sensitive 
to the privacy and mobility interests as the courts of Idaho, 
Washington and Oregon and raise questions regarding the validity 
of roadblocks. It is significant that the Utah Supreme Court 
relied upon the authority of Washington and Oregon courts in 
interpreting the Constitution of Utah as it applied to vehicle 
searches in State v. Larocco, supra, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. at 20. 
In State v. Talbot, supra, this court held that the avoidance of 
a roadblock by a motorist did not provide reasonable suspicion to 
stop and question the motorist. In so doing the court held that 
a person may choose to avoid and not talk to an officer when that 
person is in an automobile as well as on foot. The roadblock in 
the instant case was not voluntary—the officers were positioned 
to pursue any person who attempted to avoid it, even a passenger 
who might try to walk away. (T-25) . If it were wholly 
voluntary it would be a "level one" stop and the Fourth 
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Amendment and, presumably, Section 14, Article I, would not 
apply. See, e.g., State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) . As this court indicated in Talbot, 134 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 19, several courts which have validated roadblocks have 
taken into consideration the existence of a policy allowing 
persons to avoid roadblocks if they wish to. See, e.g., State v. 
Superior Court. 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073, 1075 (1984) (en 
banc) (officer would follow evader but not stop unless pursuant 
to other violation); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 241 
Cal Rptr. 42, 743 P.2d 1299, 1315 (1987) (sufficient advance 
warning given so that motorist could avoid roadblock); Little v. 
State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903, 906 (1984) (no action would be 
taken if driver chose to avoid roadblock) ; People v. Peil, 122 
Misc. 2d 617, 471 N.Y.S.2d 532, 535 (Justice Ct. 1984) (had 
defendant chosen, he could have avoided roadblock without 
recourse by police). 
However, where authority and the implicit threat of force 
are used to force* a stop and enforce a detention, as was done in 
the instant case, the Utah appellate courts have uniformly 
required at least an articuable, reasonable suspicion that the 
person stopped has been, is, or is about to be engaged in 
unlawful activity. E.g., State v. Baird, supra; Sandy City v. 
Thorness, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (Ct. App. August 18, 1989); State 
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v. Schlosser, 108 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Sup. Ct. 1989) . The Utah 
appellate courts have not recognized an exception to this 
requirement nor suggested that the stopping and detaining of all 
traffic vitiates the need for individualized, reasonable 
suspicion of wrongdoing. Certainly the intrusion on the 
citizen's liberty is not lessened because it is happening to 
everyone. 
It is submitted that the Pennsylvania Superior Court 
correctly analyzed the situation when after review of the cases, 
if stated in Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 502 A.2d 221, 225-26 (Pa. 
Super. 1985): 
While the arguments supporting the 
constitutionality of systematic roadblocks 
are persuasive, the rationale supporting them 
is flawed. No amount of control or limited 
discretion can justify the "seizure" that 
takes place in the complete absence of 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion that a 
motor vehicle violation has occurred. 
Certainly, the Constitution of our 
Commonwealth affords its citizens the right 
to be free from intrusions where one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. 
It is suggested that the Constitution of Utah affords its 
citizens no less. Section 14, Article I of the Constitution of 
Utah prohibits roadblocks regardless of how they are regulated or 
conducted for the reason that they result in a seizure of the 
person without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing by the person 
detained. 
POINT III: ASSUMING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
ROADBLOCKS, THIS ROADBLOCK VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT AND SECTION 14, ARTICLE I 
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY DEMONSTRATED 
NEED NOR PROPERLY REGULATED. 
The United States Supreme Court and some state courts have 
held or suggested that roadblocks are constitutional if the state 
establishes that the public interest in controlling a problem out 
weighs the intrusion and the roadblock is properly regulated to 
limit the discretion of the officers in the field and to minimize 
the intrusion upon the rights of motorists. In Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 440 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the 
Court held it violated the Fourth Amendment to randomly stop 
motorists, in the absence of individualized suspicion of 
wrongdoing, for the purpose of checking drivers' licenses and 
vehicle registration documents. However, the Court observed: 
This holding does not preclude the State 
of Delaware or other States from developing 
methods for spot checks that involve less 
intrusion or that do not involve the 
unconstrained exercise of discretion. * 
440 U.S. at 664. In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 58 
L.W. 4784 (June 14, 1990), the Supreme Court evaluated a 
checkpoint system which had been conducted under procedural 
guidelines promulgated by the Director of the Department of State 
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Police to check for signs of intoxication shown by motorists 
passing through. The average delay for each vehicle was 25 
seconds. The Court stated: 
In sum, the balance of the State's 
interest in preventing drunken driving, the 
extent to which this system can reasonably be 
said to advance that interest, and the degree 
of intrusion upon individual motorists who 
are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the 
state program. We therefore hold that is 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment. 
58 L.W. at 4784. 
Davis and Wallentine, A Model for Analyzing the 
Constitutionality of Sobriety Roadblock Stops in Utah, 4 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 357 (1989), summarizes the Fourth Amendment test for the 
validity of the seizure which occurs at roadblock as follows: 
The first step considers the gravity of 
public concerns served by the seizure as 
demonstrated by specific, objective facts. 
Second, the degree to which the seizure 
advances the public interest must be 
considered. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the severity of the intrusion on 
individual liberty will be weighed. 
3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 374-75. (Emphasis in original). 
The record in the instant case is murky at best with regard 
to the public concern served by this roadblock. The district 
court found that the roadblock was a continuation of the 
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training session and was conducted for the purpose of checking 
for drivers licenses; registration, liability insurance, and auto 
safety and observing for any violation of the criminal law 
including alcohol and controlled substance abuse. Finding 3, 
Ruling (R-27). While it is conceded that the state has an 
interest in training officers and in enforcing motor vehicle 
regulations and the criminal law, these concerns are so broad as 
to be almost meaningless in the context of applying the first 
step of the constitutional test. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence elicited as to how the roadblock was perceived to 
advance these concerns. It is submitted that the state failed to 
demonstrate either what the particular public concern was or how 
the roadblock served that concern. The district court was 
therefore unable to evaluate those factors to properly determine 
if they outweighed the intrusion upon the rights of the motoring 
public. This failure is particularly significant in view of the 
fact that the decision to implement the roadblock in the first 
place was made by officers in the field rather than by either the 
legislature or high level, policy making officials in the 
executive branch. In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
supra, the decision to implement the roadblock was made by the 
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Director of the Michigan Department of State Police4 in response 
to the particularized problem of drunk driving and was 
implemented in accordance with guidelines regulating site 
selection, publicity and operations. 
One measure of the severity of the intrusion is the amount 
of delay caused to the motorists whose journey is interrupted. 
The average delay in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 
supra, was 25 seconds, 58 L.W. 4782, Davis and Wallentine, supra, 
observe that n[m]ost roadblocks require only a few minutes time" 
and note case examples of fifteen to thirty seconds, five to 
twenty seconds; and two to three minutes. 3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 
378-79, n. 124. Appellant and his passenger were detained in 
line for ten minutes before talking to the first officer. (T-
69) . The motorists who were not waived through or further 
detained because of "some problem" were delayed an additional two 
or three minutes answering questions or producing documents. (T-
74) . All the motorists inconvenienced by this roadblock were 
delayed far longer than those stopped at any of the roadblocks 
sustained in other jurisdictions. However, appellant contends 
that the length of time of the seizure is not the most important 
factor. 
4
 The decision does not indicate whether or not there was 
explicit legislative authority for checkpoints in Michigan. 
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There is a significant intrusion upon privacy when a law 
enforcement officer stops a vehicle, identifies the occupants and 
demands to know their destination. Although, this court has 
noted the citizen's right to refuse to answer, few people are 
aware of that right or have the courage to assert it, 
particularly when they perceive that their freedom to continue on 
their way is at risk. 
The most flagrant deficiency in the planning and operation 
of this roadblock was the lack of regulations and standards 
imposed by policy making officials. Davis and Wallentine, supra, 
state: 
The restraint of subjectivity by officers 
in roadblocks is critical. Nearly every case 
assessing the constitutionality of a 
roadblock addresses the "neutral target 
criteria" aspect of the roadblock operation, 
and bases the decision on the presence and 
comprehensiveness of the operational formula 
designed to promote objectivity. 
3 BYU J. PUB. L. at 379. Sergeant Mangelson devised his own plan 
which he submitted to his immediate supervisor, a lieutenant who 
is a section commander in the field.5 This is hardly the 
5
 Sergeant Mangelson ordinarily supervised four troopers. 
His supervisor, Lieutenant Utley, supervised three sergeants in 
his "zone" which was comprised of two counties, Juab and Utah. 
Above the Lieutenant in the chain of command were a captain, an 
assistant superintendent and the Superintendent of the Highway 
Patrol. (T-38-40) . 
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involvement by policy level officers, who might be expected to 
have a greater concern about the roadblock's intrusion on liberty 
and privacy and the imposition upon the time of citizens and 
voters, called for by the cases. See, e.g., State v. Hilleshiem. 
291 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Iowa 1980) (pre-determination by policy 
making administrators of the time, location and procedures); 
Little v. State. 497 A.2d 903, 911 (Md. 1984) (field officers 
discretion carefully circumscribed by regulations previously 
established by high level administrative officials) ; Commonwealth 
v. McGeocrhecran. 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (Mass. 1983) (pre-arranged 
plan established by supervisory staff is essential); State v. 
Martin. 496 A. 2d 442, 448 (Vt. 1985) (clear objective guidelines 
established by high level administrative officials). 
As argued, supra. the legislature should make the decision 
in the first instance as to when, why and how roadblocks are to 
be used if they are not precluded by the state constitution. 
But, failing that, the Highway Patrol should establish standards 
and criteria which circumscribe the discretion of the officers in 
the field. This court required no less in resolving the 
analogous question of whether to permit officers to open 
containers during an otherwise valid inventory search of a 
vehicle whose driver has been arrested. In State v. Shamblin. 94 
Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App. 1988), this court held that 
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containers could be opened during an inventory search of a 
vehicle only if the opening of containers was mandated by a 
specific departmental procedure. 
Furthermore, Sergeant Mangelson's self-devised plan was not 
always followed. While all non-commercial vehicles were directed 
into the coned-off lane to wait to be interrogated, according to 
the unrefuted testimony of Mr. Burke, not all drivers were asked 
to produce documents. He observed the officers waive through 
older couples without checking documents. (T-68). 
It is often remarked in justification of imposing the 
exclusionary rule, that its purpose is not to protect the guilty 
who are before the court but the innocent whose rights might have 
been similarly imposed upon without incriminating result. 
Apparently, appellant and his passenger and, perhaps, two others 
cited for Marijuana possession, were the only ones found with 
contraband at this roadblock, but hundreds if not thousands of 
persons were inconvenienced and had their liberty and privacy 
infringed for no other reason than that they were traveling on an 
interstate highway during a time when Sergeant Mangelson was 
teaching other officers "techniques of getting into vehicles". 
(T-6). 
If this court is to find roadblocks to be permissible 
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without statutory authority, it should at least mandate that the 
decision to conduct such roadblocks be made at the highest level 
of the executive department and that standards and regulations 
for the conducting roadblocks be promulgated which minimize as 
far as possible the intrusion upon the constitutionally protected 
interests of the traveling public. Since that was not done in 
the instant case, this court should find the initial seizure and 
resulting searches unconstitutional. 
POINT IV: REGARDLESS OF THE LEGALITY OF THE 
ROADBLOCK AND THE INITIAL SEARCH, THE 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF APPELLANT'S LUGGAGE 
VIOLATED THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
After the small amount of Marijuana and the vial of 
suspected cocaine had been discovered, and after appellant and 
Mr. Burke had been placed under arrest and handcuffed, Sergeant 
Mangelson and Patrolman Lloyd continued to search the vehicle, 
including suitcases that were in the back of the Blazer one of 
which, when opened, revealed the twenty-seven ounces of cocaine. 
(T-13). 
In the district court, appellant sought to suppress this 
evidence, regardless of the legality of the initial seizure at 
the roadblock on the grounds that the search of the suitcases 
without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment and Section 14, 
Article I of the Constitution of Utah. See, Memorandum in 
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Support of Motion to Suppress, 6-9 (R-14, 19-22). 
The Utah Supreme Court has since clarified the law with 
respect to the application of the warrant requirement to 
automobile searches by interpreting the Section 14, Article I, 
Constitution of Utah independently of the Fourth Amendment to the 
United States making it unnecessary to analyze the confusing and 
conflicting federal cases on the subject on this appeal. Justice 
Durham, in State v. Larocco, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 23 (May 30, 
1990), states: 
The Supreme Court's Chambers-through-
Carney line of cases cannot be squared with 
the oft-stated principle that warrants-when-
practicable is the best policy. 3 W. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure §7.2(b), at 35. These 
cases expand the automobile exception by 
ignoring the mobility factor and implementing 
the rationale of diminished expectation of 
privacy. This expansion and the vacillation 
between the warrant approach and the 
reasonableness approach have resulted in 
significant confusion about federal search 
and seizure law regarding automobiles. 
The . time has come for this court, in 
applying an automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement of article I, section 14 
of the Utah Constitution, to try to simplify, 
if possible, the search and seizure rules so 
that they can be more easily followed by the 
police and the courts, and, at the same time, 
provide the public with consistent and 
predictable protection against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. This can be 
accomplished by eliminating some of the 
confusing exceptions to the warrant 
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r e qu i rement t ha t h a v e bee n d e ve 1 oped b y 
federal law in recent years. See id. 
Specifically, this court will continue to use 
the concept of expectation of privacy as a 
suitable threshold criterion for determining 
whether article I, section 14 is applicable. 
Then if article I, section 14 applies, 
warrantless searches will be permitted only 
where they satisfy their traditional 
justification, namely, to protect the safety 
of police or public or to prevent the 
destruction of evidence. See id. ; see also, 
£•3* / Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762-63 {] 969) , 
Th^ proper analyse ..:..«c; -.: <• >' .* 
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: •* was tilt probabl • • - vi-. •• ear''h) "re 
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had probable cause, assuming for purposes ot this ai:qumei it that 
the roadblock and resulting initial search was legal. The 
6
 While Justice Stewart concurred flin result" in Larocco 
without stating his views, his view as expressed in his own 
decisions i n other cases is that, under the "Fourth Amendment, 
warrants are required unless an exception is shown. See, e.g., 
State v. Arroyo, 137 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 15 (Sup. Ct. June 28, 
1990). 
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remaining question is were there circumstances which justified an 
exception to the warrant requirement of Section 14, Article I. 
As Justice Durham in Larocco, supra, said: 
The next step requires justification of 
the warrantless search by showing either 
that the procurement of a warrant would have 
jeopardized the safety of the police 
officers or that the evidence was likely to 
have been lost or destroyed. 
In the instant case the appellant and his passenger, while 
still at the scene, were handcuffed and in the custody of other 
officers. There was a total of thirty-five officers available 
in the immediate area. If there was a possible danger that the 
prisoners might break away, open the back of the vehicle and open 
a suitcase while handcuffed to obtain a weapon or somehow destroy 
the cocaine, which seems difficult to imagine, they could have 
been easily removed from the scene. 
The Larocco, decision quoted State v. Hygh, 711 P. 2d 264, 
272 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman concurring), as follows: 
Once the threat that the suspect will 
injure the officers with concealed weapons or 
will destroy evidence is gone, there is no 
persuasive reason why the officers cannot 
take the time to secure a warrant. Such a 
requirement would present little impediment 
to police investigations, especially in light 
of the ease with which warrants can be 
obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant 
statute, U.C.A., 1953, §7-23-4(2)(1982 ed.). 
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135 Utah Adv. Rep, at 23. The Larocco decision also affirmed 
that the burden of showing exigent circumstances is upon the 
state. 135 Utah Adv. Rep, at 24. In the instant case the state 
clearly failed to show that the delay which might have resulted 
if a warrant had been sought would have endangered the officers 
or the evidence. 
The only other exception to the warrant requirement which 
might be argued is the impound inventory exception. See, State 
v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 267 (Utah 1985). However, no claim was 
made at the hearing that the search of the suitcases was an 
inventory search.7 Furthermore, this court has previously held 
that the opening of containers during a valid inventory search is 
prohibited fay the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution in the absence of standardized, departmental 
regulations mandating the opening of all containers in inventory 
searches. State v. Shamblin, 9 4 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (Ct. App. 
1988) . 
Since /the state has fai led. to prove any facts supporting an 
exception to the warrant requirement, the evidence seized from 
7
 There was an initial claim that the small vial 
containing Marijuana "roaches" which was found in an even later 
search was found in an inventory search. (T-14). However, on 
cross-examination the officer conceded it was a "plain search 
search" rather than an inventory search. (T-16). This later 
search at the impound lot was also Illegal of course. 
41 
the appellant's suitcase should have been suppressed regardless 
of the legality of the initial detention and prior search of the 
vehicle. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the conviction in this case was based solely upon 
evidence which was seized in the course of searches which 
violated appellants rights secured by Section 14, Article I of 
the Constitution of Utah and the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, this court should reverse the judgment and 
sentence of the district court. 
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